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Abstract
Both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have developed diametrically opposed
national narratives and identities that are both predicated on the concept of victimization. These
narratives have developed into simulacral narratives as the result of the nature of their
development. This paper deals with the Palestinian simulacral narrative which bolsters societal
values, particularly the value of victimhood, that are crucial to coping with the prolonged
conflict. The Western media, at any given moment during the conflict, has either accepted the
concept of Palestinian‟s as victims of the conflict and the Palestinian simulacral narrative, or
rejected it. The media then produces a hyperreality of the conflict for its Western viewers which
influences the West‟s acceptance or rejection of the Palestinian simulacral narrative. This paper
uses Michel Khleifi‟s Canticle of the Stones, Hany Abu-Assad‟s Paradise Now, and Elia
Sulieman‟s Chronicle of a Disappearance and Divine Intervention to examine the degree to
which Palestinian films confirm or contradict the societal beliefs that contribute to the
prolongation of the conflict and the relationship between the presentation of those beliefs, the
hyperreality of the Western community, and Western public opinion. It also examines the
relationship between the presentation of violence in the films and the presence of violence in
Palestine.
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Palestinian Film: Hyperreality, Narrative, and Ideology
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has contributed and continues to contribute to instability
in the Middle East and yet, despite the efforts of the international community, remains unsettled.
While there are a number of factors that have made this particular dispute difficult to solve, one
dominant factor appears to be that both sides of the conflict have developed diametrically
opposed national narratives and identities. Scholars agree that many early Palestinian
documentary films were used to create a counter narrative to the Zionist narrative (Alexander
“Palestinians in Film” 321; Gertz and Khleifi “Roadblock” 317) but the more recent fictional
films break away from the homogenized treatment of Palestinian identity for political means and
offer new frames of reference for Palestinian existence and cultural identity (Gertz and Khleifi
“Roadblock” 322). While early Palestinian film most likely played a role in the development of
the national narrative, the Palestinian national narrative and national identity have developed as
the result of a variety of political and psychological factors, each of which‟s individual influence
is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle from the others. While there are certain historical
events that undisputedly took place, the degree to which they are emphasized or dismissed, and
the interpretation and memorialization of these events is starkly different on either side of the
Green Line. There are also, undoubtedly, a variety of interpretations of the historical events in
Israel and Palestine by the many different religious, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups in the
region. For the sake of this paper, however, I will limit myself to the two broad and generalized
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narratives perpetuated by the governing forces on either side of the Green Line and which
function as national narratives for both sides. For example, the Israeli and Palestinian
descriptions of the events of 1948, even in very broad and general terms, are different and at
odds. According to the Israeli narrative, Israel declared itself a nation in 1948, most of the
Palestinians left the area of their own free will, and the Israeli settlers, now citizens, only used
violence against Palestinians in self defense. Palestinians, however, argue that when Israel
became a nation, Israeli militia forces forcibly removed them from their homes, stole their land,
and the Palestinians fled in fear of their lives. This disparity is perhaps most evident in the way
the events of 1948 are memorialized by both sides: Israel celebrates its independence day while
Palestinians mourn the same day as “al-Nakba,” or “the disaster.” According to Rouhana and
Bar-Tal, the Palestinians and the Israeli narratives of the conflict “emphasize different aspects of
the conflict, provide divergent interpretations to the same events, and produce a coherent
narrative that supports its own claims and is fully supported by the community” (763). One
foundational concept to both of these narratives is the history of victimization and the
identification with victimhood from which both sides suffer.
The Palestinian narrative is predicated on the victimization of Palestinians and the
vilification of Israel while the Israeli narrative is predicated on precisely the reverse. Both sides
also possess histories of violent persecution. Rouhana and Bar-Tal claim that the history of
victimization leads to a mistrust of the international community and a sense of lack of security on
both sides of the conflict (765). This history of victimization influences the tendency of both
sides of the conflict to identify as the victim of the other side: Israel believes itself to be the
victim of Arab aggression, while Palestinians believe themselves to be the victim of Israeli
Zionists (766). Because the role of victim receives sympathy from the media, the role of who,
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exactly, is the victim in this conflict is fiercely contested (Brand 176). Identifying as the victim,
according to Brand, has other benefits as well. While there are a number of places where Brand‟s
analysis of Paradise Now is reductive, which I will discuss later, he brings up useful points about
the dialectical pairing of aggression and victimization. He claims that identifying as the victim
allows the individual to justify his or her aggression while enjoying the moral superiority of
victimhood by insisting that his or her actions are the product of circumstances beyond his or her
control (175-6). It is precisely this phenomenon that he claims, and Rouhana and Bar-Tal agree,
perpetuates the violence of the conflict (Brand 178) and contributes to its intractability (Rouhana
and Bar-Tal 764). The identification with victimhood is one of the primary elements of the
Palestinian national narrative and it is the fight for international recognition of victimization that
concerns much of this paper.
The events of 1948 are particularly noteworthy because they have played a foundational
role in the formation of both nations‟ national identities (Rouhana and Bar-Tal) and are an
example of the Israeli and Palestinian simulacral narratives. I refer to these narratives as
“simulacral” simply because both narratives have become so far detached from the actual
historical events of 1948-9 that the real events are no longer truly accessible beneath the
sedimented layers of interpretation. Rather than representing a “real” series of events, each side
has gathered an amalgamation of folk lore, eye witness accounts, films, and propaganda to
develop national narratives that, though initially based on a real series of events, have ceased to
bear any relation to the actual events that occurred. Bresheeth argues that “all existence in
Palestine/Israel is double existence. So there are two virtual countries within the same space, two
parallel universes disregarding and disparaging each other, and yet, totally bound to each other”
(80-81). Michel Khleifi himself declared, “I don‟t believe in the past, it has vanished” (Khleifi
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and Alexander 33). The constant conflict over borders and narrative, which many scholars claim
to be intrinsically tied to issues of identity as well (Bresheeth 72; Gertz and Khleifi “Roadblock”
320), has led to the creation of a national narrative that is merely a simulation of what might
have happened rather than an account or representation of what did happen. The narrative of the
events of 1948-9, as well as others, has moved through Baudrillard‟s cycle from being a
reflection of reality, to being a perversion of reality, to masking the lack of reality, to becoming
pure simulation of reality. This is not to say that certain events that compose the Palestinian
national narrative never took place or that individual experiences of the events are inaccessible.
However, the composite narrative of the major events has been collected, interpreted, and
manipulated in such a way as to produce a narrative that is simulacral in nature. These
simulacral narratives have come to stand for and be used for social and political means of
establishing and reifying national ideologies. The ideology produced by these simulacral
narratives promotes the struggle to obtain culturally defined desires, such as a national
homeland, instead of natural desires, such as safety, security, and peace. Because of the role of
these simulacral narratives in developing national identities, they are fiercely guarded and
defended by the respective populations.
Rouhana and Bar-Tal examine some of the psychological factors that contribute to what
they term “intractable ethnonational conflicts” and identify four societal beliefs regarding the
conflict that contribute to the intractability of the situations. The Israeli and Palestinian
simulacral narratives have contributed to ideologies on either side that perpetuate the turmoil
because the narratives confirm these four societal beliefs. Rouhana and Bar-Tal explain that in an
ostensibly intractable ethnonational conflict, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, certain
societal beliefs are maintained and protected as a type of coping mechanism in order for the
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populations to deal with the violence and hardships of prolonged conflict (765). The four societal
beliefs that they mention as the most important are the belief that the goals of the group are just,
the opponent is illegitimate, the group can do no wrong in regards to the conflict, and the group
is the victim (765). These four societal beliefs can be simplified into roughly two: one side is the
righteous victim, while the other is an illegitimate enemy. In order to continue the struggle
against Israel, the Palestinians must adopt and safeguard these beliefs, all of which are
encompassed in the Palestinian simulacral narrative; however, as previously mentioned, these
beliefs, particularly the identification with victimhood, are precisely one of the reasons the
conflict is so difficult to resolve. While I believe this is a phenomenon that takes place on both
sides of the conflict, I am dealing with four Palestinian films and will only be treating the
Palestinian simulacral narrative and societal beliefs in this paper.
This simulacral narrative also has an effect on the Western community‟s perception of
events. The international ruling bodies and the general Western public are composed of few
people who have a lived experience of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As a result, most rely on
media coverage and reports in order to form their opinions. However, the media coverage of the
conflict creates what Baudrillard calls a hyperreality for the Western media viewer in which the
“reality” of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as understood by the West, is different from and does
not necessarily bear any relationship to the actual events that occur in Israel and the Palestine.
This hyperreality is created by the saturation of Western Media with images and sound bites of
the conflict, each of which, on some level, is an interpretation of an event or situation. The sole
reliance of the Western viewer upon these incomplete, often inaccurate or severely biased
interpretations of the events causes the Western viewer to develop a conceptualization of the
conflict that is wholly based on interpretation and wholly unreal. The uninformed Westerner‟s
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concept of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not exist, and yet, the uniformed Westerner
believes it to be the reality of the conflict. The interpretations that create this hyperreality shift
and change in favor of or in opposition to the Palestinian simulacral narrative based on various
events and political climates. However, the West still presumes this shifting hyperreality to be
the actual reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, regardless of its relationship, or lack thereof,
to the actual events taking place in the area. Again, this is not to say that events are not taking
place or that the conflict does not actually exist, but that the Western concept of the conflict is
produced in newsrooms and through interpretations, not by the actual events that are taking
place. This phenomenon goes beyond Edward Said‟s concept of Western Orientalists creating
the East because, in Said‟s work, the Orientalist‟s interpretation becomes more important than
the real that is being interpreted, but it does not fully replace it. For viewers of Western media
who have no other experience or knowledge of the conflict, the media representation of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the reality of the conflict. Another problem with using only Said‟s
work is that the hyperreality that is produced is not purely the result of Western influences.
Israel, technically an Eastern country, plays a role in manipulating US media to produce its
desired image in the country (Mershimer and Walt 45) which is, in part, why the hyperreality is
usually slanted towards a pro-Israeli stance. This hyperreal media narrative of events, because of
its sole basis on interpretations, is more flexible and changing than Israeli or Palestinian
simulacral narratives. There is also less ideological and psychological pressure to maintain a
single, unwavering narrative of events in the West because such a narrative is not a defining
characteristic of the West, as it is for the Israelis and Palestinians. As a result, Western opinion is
able to shift, depending on the media content and images coming from the Israeli/Palestinian
area. This, in turn, affects the West‟s understanding of the conflict, making public opinion more
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or less sympathetic to one side or the other. This popular opinion of the Western community has
a relationship to the way in which different types of violence are portrayed in Palestinian
fictional films.
The presence of visual violence in Palestinian films appears to be related to the degree to
which Western public opinion accepts the simulacral Palestinian narrative of victimhood. The
media plays a key role in this acceptance or rejection of the Palestinian simulacral narrative in
that it chooses which images and sound bites are presented to the public. These images interpret
the events of the conflict in a manner consistent with or contradictory to the Palestinian
simulacral narrative and its foundational concept that Palestinians are the victim of Israeli
violence. In return, the Western community who views these images is, in effect, steered toward
acceptance or rejection of the Palestinian simulacral narrative based on these media
interpretations. The Palestinian films I examine in this paper appear to show more or less visual
violence based, at least in part, on how the West views the Palestinian simulacral narrative at the
time of production, though the types of violence treated in the films are different. Michel
Khleifi‟s Canticle of the Stones (1990) and Hany Abu-Assad‟s Paradise Now (2005),
demonstrate the typical, expected, relationship between the depiction of violence in Palestinian
films and Western public opinion for full length, fictional, dramatic films. Canticle of the Stones,
filmed when the Palestinian simulacral narrative was in favor in the West, contains a large
amount of resistance violence and, because it was also filmed during an uprising, strongly
confirms Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s four societal beliefs and, in turn, the Palestinian simulacral
narrative. Khleifi is able to do this by using visual violence of both resistance fighters and the
Israeli army to demonstrate the impact of the Israeli occupation on the whole of Palestinian
society on both communal and personal levels. The presentation of this violence ultimately
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confirms that Palestinians are purely victims and Israel is purely the villain. Paradise Now, on
the other hand, was filmed when the Palestinian simulacral narrative was not in favor in the
West, so it contains little visual violence and actually deprives viewers of the expected violence
at the end of the film. It is also important to point out that while Khleifi is dealing with violence
done to the Palestinian people and violence used in a military context to resist oppression, AbuAssad‟s film is treating violence that is directed at civilians and has been committed for the sake
of continuing the resistance rather than ending the occupation. Paradise Now was filmed during
a time of Palestinian disunity and towards the end of the second Intifada and it only confirms two
of Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s societal beliefs, while directly contradicting the other two which
actually calls into question some aspects of the Palestinian simulacral narrative.
The relationship between the depiction of violence in Elia Suleiman‟s films, Chronicle of
a Disappearance (1996) and Divine Intervention (2002), and Western public opinion, however,
is seemingly contradictory to that of Khleifi and Abu-Assad‟s films. This difference, however, is
the result of the difference of genre; Suleiman‟s films are comedies, and, as such, the violence in
them is not perceived by the West in the same manner as violence in serious dramas. The
violence in Divine Intervention is exaggerated, comical, and not meant to be taken seriously.
Chronicle of a Disappearance was filmed as the Oslo Accords were failing and as Palestinians
were losing favor in the West because religious extremists continued to use terrorist techniques
to attack Israel (Smith 246; Baxter and Akbarzadeh 145-6). There also happens to be virtually no
violence in the film, and the societal beliefs and Palestinian simulacral narrative are only weakly
supported by the events of the film. There was no uprising at the time, so the need to bolster
ideology was lessened. Divine Intervention, however, was filmed during the first two years of the
second Intifada, a time when Palestinians had little support in West because of the continued use
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of suicide bombing (Smith 248), which would lead one to suspect the film, like Paradise Now, to
contain little violence. However, Divine Intervention contains much more visual violence than
Chronicle of a Disappearance, though not nearly so much as Canticle of the Stones. Like in
Canticle of the Stones, the presence of visual violence in Divine Intervention correlates to the
presence of a relatively organized resistance movement on the ground, the second Intifada.
However, because the film is a comedy and the scenes are hyperbolic, the violence in Divine
Intervention functions to different ideological ends. Because of the exaggerated and fantastical
nature of the violence, the scenes actually function to mock the Israeli belief that Palestinians are
an existential threat to Israel which in turn bolster‟s the Palestinian simulacral narrative.
However, far from being the ringing endorsement of Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s four societal beliefs,
Suleiman‟s second film only confirms three.
It is important to understand the relationship between Western perceptions of the conflict
and the presentation of Palestinian societal beliefs in these films because of the transnational
nature of both the films and the directors. Two of the directors currently live in diaspora in
Europe, Khleifi in Belgium and Abu-Assad in the Netherlands, while Suleiman, though living in
Ramallah now, spent over ten year in the United States. Palestine, because of the violence and
economic strangling from the occupation, does not have a film industry. Gertz and Khleifi
explain that if a Palestinian wishes to make a film, he or she must use foreign crews, find foreign
funding, and, often, have been trained in a foreign country (“Chronicle” 189). This situation
creates an interesting and often times difficult, dynamic for Palestinian filmmakers. Livia
Alexander explains:
On the one hand, there is an identification with and evaluation by Western
standards of film production, funding, and distribution, as well as the experience
of living in exile in the West. On the other hand, being members of a people
denied their right to land and to nationhood or being regarded merely as „terrorist‟
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placed Palestinians in a marginal position in the West. Offering a site of resistance
and negotiation from this position, their film production is closely concerned with
issues of Palestinian identity and existence. (Alexander “Palestinians in Film”
320)
The experiences of the filmmakers in the West undeniably influences both the style and content
of the work, as does being Palestinian. When asked about his decision to live in Belgium, Khleifi
replied: “the fact that I live internationally does not make me forget that I‟m from a small street
in Nazareth. Although, let‟s be realistic, yes I live in Europe so I‟m part of Europe as well”
(Khleifi and Alexander 33). Because of these dual influences on the directors, examining these
films in relation to Western public opinion, which might very well have an influence, conscious
or unconscious, on such international directors, is both legitimate and useful in terms of
understanding some of the complex issues at work in these four films.
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Canticle of the Stones
In Canticle of the Stones, Michel Khleifi presents the story of two lovers who were
separated by the violence and difficult circumstances that the Israeli occupation produced. This
narrative, which is filmed using a formal style, is interspersed with documentary footage of
various situations and stories of people living in Palestine during the first Intifada. Khleifi‟s films
often treat the clash of two worlds (Telmissany 77) because he believes that the “spirit of the
cinema” is to show a clash of elements. For Canticle of the Stones this is the clash between the
violence of the intifada and the fictional story (Khleifi and Alexander 32), but he also conveys
this clash of elements using a clash of forms as well, formal and documentary. Gertz and Khleifi,
in their book, argue that Michel Khleifi‟s films, unlike later Palestinian films, contain a more
cohesive sense of the landscape, and, while they predominantly discuss Wedding in Galilee and
A Tale of Three Jewells to do so, much of what is said can also be applied to Canticle of the
Stones. In Wedding in Galilee, Khleifi includes images of landscapes and citiscapes and uses
camera work to transcend borders and to recreate the land that has been fragmented (Gertz and
Khleifi Palestinian Cinema 82-3), but Khleifi does so in Canticle of the Stones as well. It is
through similar camera work and juxtaposition of images, and his use of the “collective memory
of Palestinians,” which contains diverse, but “closely knit” experiences that contribute to an
over-all identity (76), that Khleifi is able to examine the multiple layers of Palestinian society in
the film. In this film, Khleifi uses the different film styles, formal and documentary, to focus on
the consequences of Israeli violence on multiple levels of Palestinian society: individual,
familial, and communal. While this contrast works to establish a distinction between personal
and impersonal experiences of the occupation, all of the experiences mentioned or displayed are
inextricably tied to the violence of the occupation and resistance and work to demonstrate the
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pervasiveness of the occupation. Khleifi‟s portrayal of the violence continually reaffirms the core
Palestinian concept of the Palestinian people as the victims of Israeli violence. In comparison to
more recent films, such as Paradise Now, Khleifi‟s film directly depicts significantly more
violence and active anger. While this violence is of a different type than that in Paradise Now or
Divine Intervention, it is still visual violence. Because of the media representation of the first
Intifada and the relatively small amount of violence Palestinians used during the first Intifada,
the Palestinian simulacral narrative of victimization was accepted and propagated by
international media which, in turn, lead to a general acceptance of the Palestinian simulacral
narrative in Western public opinion. The violence in Khleifi‟s film works to strongly confirm the
societal beliefs that bolster the Palestinian simulacral narrative.

Hyperreality, Western Opinion, and Societal Beliefs
The political factors surrounding the first Intifada relate to the presence and prevalence
of violence in Khleifi‟s film. The media images coming out of the West Bank and Gaza during
the first Intifada created a shift in the hyperreality concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
favor of the Palestinian simulacral narrative, which resulted in a shift of Western public opinion
regarding the conflict as well. The favorable political surroundings created by this shift coincide
with Khleifi‟s use of large amounts of visual violence in his film. This violence works to bolster
and progress the four core Palestinian ideological societal beliefs: presenting Palestinians as
victims, justifying the resistance movement and the behavior of its participants, and
delegitimizing Israel as much as possible.
The first Intifada began as a grassroots, popular uprising against the Israeli occupation in
December of 1987. This uprising, unlike the subsequent al-Aqsa Intifada, involved relatively
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little violence on the part of the Palestinian resistance fighters. They primarily used peaceful
means of protesting and boycotting and, when they did attack Israeli soldiers, the vast majority
threw sticks and stones. These methods were met with harsh repressive actions by Israel such as
tear gas, beatings, rubber and actual bullets, and curfews, which worked to tarnish Israel‟s
international reputation. According to Baxter and Akbarzadeh, “images of Palestinian children
armed with stones facing off with Israeli armored vehicles were beamed throughout the world
[…] and images of Israeli soldiers beating unarmed Palestinian civilians only intensified
international calls for resolution” (140). These media images saturated the international media
and turned the tide of public opinion against Israel, who had always portrayed itself as the victim
of its hostile Arab neighbors. For the first time since the beginning of the occupation, the West
accepted a fundamental part of the Palestinian simulacral narrative: that the Palestinians were, in
actuality, victims of the Israeli occupation. Khleifi‟s film also functions to confirm and support
the Palestinian simulacral narrative by strongly confirming Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s core societal,
and ideological, beliefs.
Khleifi is able to support the claim that the Palestinians‟ goals are just primarily through
his documentary footage. Most of the documentary footage, because of its depiction of the
interwoven-ness of individual, familial, and community life, connects the actions or sufferings of
the individuals to the greater Palestinian cause. In Mohammad‟s sequence, Mohammad‟s friend
mentions the right of Palestinians to have a state and a right to self determination. The father,
whose son was shot while moving barrels for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), ends his story
with an appeal to end the occupation. Several other documentary subjects also make connections
to the Palestinian goal to have their own state, free of Israeli soldiers. By linking the violence and
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tragedy in these stories with the goals of the Intifada, Khleifi demonstrates that these peoples‟
sacrifices are justified because the goal of the Intifada is just.
Similarly, much of the same footage is used to demonstrate the injustice and illegitimacy
of the Israeli occupation. The footage of the Israeli soldiers firing at young boys who are
throwing rocks and the footage of the women breaking curfew to buy food for their families both
strongly portray some of the excessive violence of the Israeli troops, which helps delegitimize
their presence in Palestine. Khleifi also includes an interview with an elderly woman who
remembers the 1948 Nakba, or “disaster,” and 1967 Naksa, or “setback.” She recounts how her
father owned large tracts of land and lost much of it in 1948 and lost even more in 1967. She
gestures out to her land and indicates that this land is all that is left of the many acres her father
once owned that the Israelis now own. This woman is too old to be an active part of the Intifada
and she has no children who could be involved in the resistance. The inclusion of her footage in
the film is simply as a means of remembering the events of 1948 and 1967 and delegitimizing
Israel‟s presence in the West Bank further.
It logically follows that if the Israeli cause is illegitimate and the Palestinian cause is just,
then the actions of the resistance movement are justified. However, Khleifi offers images that
further justify and support Palestinians‟ protests and use of mild, predominantly stone-throwing,
violence. The scene of the old woman discussing the events of 1948 and 1967 works to justify
Palestinian actions in that it offers evidence of past wrongs. If the Israelis took land from the
Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, Palestinian attempts to regain that land are justified. He also
includes instances and descriptions of the excessively violent or cruel measures of the Israeli
occupation such as demolishing the homes of innocent Palestinian families. The male
protagonist‟s family did not know about his involvement in the resistance, but the IDF destroyed
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their family home regardless of the family‟s innocence. Khleifi includes a scene of Israeli
soldiers forcing two young men to paint over graffiti on a city wall, which would have been
understandable had the two young men been the ones who had done the graffiti, but they were
simply walking towards the city when they were stopped by the soldiers and forced to paint the
wall. When they try to refuse, the soldiers threaten them with guns. These kinds of humiliation
tactics and excessive force further justify the decision of the Palestinians to revolt against the
occupation. While the film strongly confirms all four societal beliefs, the bulk of the visual
violence in the film is directed at painting the Palestinians as the self-sacrificing victims of the
occupation—a topic which will be examined, in detail, in the following section.

Film Style, Violence and Victimization
In Canticle of the Stones, Michel Khleifi uses two distinctive styles of filming to create a
contrast between the individual, personal struggles of the unnamed couple, played by Bushra
Karaman and Makram Khoury, and the experiences of Palestinian families and communities.
While the couple is filmed using a formal style, images from the community and stories of
families are filmed in a documentary style. While he also uses personal interviews in the
documentary footage, these interviews express the outrage and indignation of the Palestinian
people as they describe personal events as opposed to the fictional couple who also describe
personal events, but with more emphasis on the variety of emotions and intimate experiences
involved in the incidences rather than simply anger. As a result, the exterior, community images
convey a sense of chaos, violence, and loss while the quiet dialogue of the couple conveys a
sense of the calm stability and determination of individual Palestinians in the face of occupation,
but both styles used in the film convey strong images of violence, either visually, in the case of
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the documentary-style scenes, or through verbal description in the formal scenes of the lovers.
This violence is used as a means of emphasizing the Israeli occupation‟s victimization of the
Palestinian population as a whole.
In the overwhelming majority of the documentary footage Khleifi uses in the film, the
content regards the destruction or interruption of Palestinian communities. The first of such
scenes occurs early in the film and depicts Israeli police closing down a Palestinian all-girls
school in Jerusalem. This documentary footage is interspersed with and highly contrasts the
scenes of the lovers having quiet conversations and intimate moments. The footage of the street
outside the girls‟ school is chaotic—sirens blare in the background, multiple people speak in
quick dialect, the Israeli police shout orders and wave guns. In this footage the camera is shaky,
and the shots are short and are not formally composed, which contributes to the sense of chaos
and fear emanating from many of the individuals being interviewed. Though it includes brief
interviews with a handful of students, some parents, and a teacher, this instance is not presented
as one person‟s story but as an experience shared by a community. Young girls, most wearing
hijab, are shown loaded in the back of police vans while their mothers frantically search for
them. Another group of girls is interviewed and tries to explain that the police are shutting down
the school because they claim the girls were throwing rocks. However, the group of girls denies
the allegation and claims the police are simply provoking them. The teacher who speaks briefly
to the camera is at a loss of what to do because she cannot find any other teachers or school
officials. This footage is an indication of the effects of the occupation on multiple levels of the
community. The single act of closing down a school affects the community, from the
professionals who teach at and run the school to the young girls who attend it and their families.
This action is also aimed at a non-combat target filled with civilian women and girls. Khleifi is
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able to use this image of the forceful and violent closing of a girl‟s school to indicate that the
entire community suffers from the occupation, not just the young men fighting in the resistance
movement.
Khleifi also uses the documentary footage to show the connections between individual,
familial, and communal experiences of the Intifada. One of the best examples of this connectivity
is Muhammad‟s story, which is interwoven with his community‟s and his family‟s stories.
Though the actual footage shown is not of violent events, Muhammad describes, in detail, the
violent conditions under which he was wounded and shows the scar from the shrapnel that hit
him. Before introducing footage of Muhammad, however, Khleifi begins with Muhammad‟s
parents‟ interview, during which the boy‟s father describes how he can no longer share an apple
with his son, and his mother laments how Muhammad can no longer eat her cooking, which he
used to enjoy, because Muhammad lost most of his intestine as a result of his wound. By
introducing Muhammad‟s story through the boy‟s parents, Khleifi is indicating that
Muhammad‟s story has repercussions that reach farther than the seventeen year old boy and the
Intifada and into his family and community.
Muhammad, himself, is first filmed in his hospital bed with a friend, who periodically
contributes to the interview, also in the frame. His hospital room is decorated with pictures of
martyrs from his neighborhood and, while he does describe his wound and his personal
experience, his description is couched in the broader context of the Intifada and his community.
He often speaks about the Palestinians‟ desire to have their own state and the daily humiliation
that he and other Palestinians have suffered at the hands of the Israeli occupying forces. He
points to and describes several of the martyrs‟ photos that hang above his bed, giving the
martyr‟s name and a brief description such as “he had eight children” or “he was only fifteen.”
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His mother tells of how, the day before he was shot, Muhammad went to have his picture taken
and claimed that he would soon be a martyr. He recognizes that his experience is similar to and
connected to hundreds of other young Palestinian men who were wounded or killed under the
occupation, and his community also recognizes the connection. Muhammad is the most obvious
victim of violence in this section of the film, but he is depicted as only one victim in a long line
of similar victims through the martyr‟s photos. Khleifi uses Muhammad as one example of the
violence that the resistance fighters experience, but he also expands the resistance fighters‟ story
to include the rest of the community as well. Muhammad is not shown in isolation.
When Khleifi shows footage of Muhammad‟s return to his neighborhood, it becomes
clear that Muhammad‟s community views him as a hero, and his return is celebrated with his
entire neighborhood dancing in the street, his mother in the center of the crowd. Even this
celebration, however, cannot escape the threat of violence, as a group of Israeli soldiers stand
warily around in the distance, guns strapped to their bodies. Khleifi uses Muhammad‟s story as
evidence of the pervasive effects of the violence of the Intifada on Palestinian society. The story
of one boy‟s wound and recovery are inextricably woven with and part of the story of his
community, on behalf of whom he is fighting and who is also a victim of the occupation.
While the documentary footage includes interviews with individuals who tell their
personal story, much like the unnamed fictional couple, these stories are often graphic and
violent accounts told in angry voices and comingled with the rhetoric of the Intifada. Perhaps one
of the most striking interviews of this nature that Khleifi includes is with a middle aged man who
describes the death of his son. In this interview, the interviewee is seated and surrounded by
other members of the community. He is filmed facing the camera and talks directly into it. While
there is nothing violent about this scene visually, violence enters the scene through the man‟s
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description of his son‟s death. According to the man, when he and his son were leaving the
mosque, an IDF soldier asked the man to move barrels out of the street. Because there were
women and children present, and the soldier had already broken one child‟s arm, the man
complied, but soon asked his son for help in order to finish the task more quickly. When a group
of men attacked the soldiers by surprise, the interviewee‟s twenty-six year old son was shot ten
times and died in the street. While the man is simply telling his story, and the viewer does not
see the violence, there is a palpable anger in the man‟s voice as he speaks and, in places, shouts
about the death of his son. After telling his story, however, the man relates his son‟s death and
his own suffering to the community by showing the camera a child with a lump on his ribcage
from a lodged plastic bullet which indicates that his story is not a singular or isolated event. In
this scene Khleifi has again used one individual to represent the suffering and victimization of
the community as a whole. Like the girls in the scene of the girls‟ school, neither the interviewee
in this scene nor his dead son are resistance fighters. According to the father, the son had done
nothing to deserve being gunned down in the street and was simply at the wrong place at the
wrong time. In other words, his son was purely the victim of unprovoked Israeli violence.
In these documentary-style scenes, there is a blurring between the personal and public
both through the individuals interviewed and through the incorporation of other people, images,
and sounds within the scenes. This weaving of images, some quiet and beautiful, some loud and
chaotic, some somber and sad, others doggedly persistent, is reflective of the daily experience of
the Palestinians under occupation and designed to demonstrate the definitiveness of the
Palestinians‟ claim to victimization by Israel. While there are still pleasant experiences for
Palestinians and while life in the West Bank and Gaza does continue, these pleasant experiences
are countered at regular intervals with experiences of trauma, grief, anger, and humiliation, the
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combination of which produces a sense of victimization that Khleifi highlights in the
documentary-style scenes.
However, lest the viewer think that Palestinians are overwhelmed by this victimization,
Khleifi includes the more formal scenes between the two lovers to help demonstrate that, despite
being the victim of perpetual violence, Palestinians continue their lives in occupied Palestine
through calm persistence and determination. These scenes involving the couple are highly staged
and carefully composed. In the first scene of the pair, she is seated on the bed, slightly to the
right of the center of the screen. The room is dim, with the only light coming from a window to
the right. As she speaks, she occupies the majority of the shot; however, when the man walks
into the frame, he sits on the bed in front of her, creating an L-shaped composition of figures,
and dominates the shot. Because of the color of his light blue shirt, the lighting from the window
highlights him, making him and his speech the primary subject of the scene. Almost every scene
of the lovers is similarly, meticulously composed. Unlike the documentary-style footage, these
scenes are long, still, and quiet, except for the dialogue which is also calm and steady.
The sense of steadiness that the use of these formal elements creates is contrasted with
the topics of the couple‟s conversations. The couple discusses their personal experiences of the
occupation in intimate detail, and, while they describe the events of their lives in calm voices, the
events themselves are violent and tragic. The emphasis, however, is not on the violence of the
incident, but on the personal experience of the violence for the man and woman, as individuals
and, for some experiences, as a couple. Khleifi uses formal filmic elements, such as lighting and
scene composition, to highlight the narrator of these stories and his or her determination to
continue as normal an existence as possible in Palestine in the face of the violence and trauma
that they suffer as individuals. By including these scenes, Khleifi also contrasts the communal
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anger depicted in the documentary footage with the complex emotional experiences of the two
individuals of the couple. This contrast helps Khleifi encompass as much of the Palestinian
experience of victimization as possible in his film as well as depict the less obvious and more
personal damage that Palestinians face as a result of the occupation.
In the first scene involving the couple, the man describes the day he was arrested and his
family‟s eviction from their home as a result of his involvement in the resistance and his
imprisonment. There is a multiplicity of emotions evoked by the story he tells, but his face
remains stoic. He laments that the family lost their house as a result of his actions and recalls the
concrete as well as the abstract items the family was forced to leave behind. His description and
the emotions evoked by it contrast sharply with a documentary-style scene that Khleifi includes
towards the end of the film. In that scene, a family is being evicted from their home and their
entire neighborhood is in the process of being demolished. The scene is loud and conveys the
sense of chaos that the family is feeling as the grandmother wails about the loss of her home,
young children stand around at a loss for what to do, men strip the house of anything of value
that the family can keep, the family‟s belongings are tossed around the yard, and a young woman
speaks quickly and angrily to the camera, saying that even though they have no money for food
or medicine and now they have no home, the resistance will not be quelled. It is essentially the
same scene the man describes, but, while the documentary footage conveys anger almost
exclusively, the description the man offers of his personal experience of being evicted contains
his personal sense of sadness and loss as well as feelings of guilt for inadvertently making his
family a target of the Israeli army.
He discusses the way his family looked at him, as though they had never seen him before,
as he was being arrested and how he was responsible for the destruction of their family home. He
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tells how his family lived in a single-roomed house for a long time after the family home was
torn down, but his family did not blame him. In fact, his family stood by him. Through poetic
language, the man allows the reader to focus on and examine images that get lost in the shuffle
of noise and anger in the documentary footage. He claims that his “head is filled with the image
of a chair thrown into the sky, [his] little brother‟s socks floating in the air.” These images
captured by his dialogue allow the viewer to focus the broader picture painted by the
documentary scenes to a more narrow, personal experience. While there were furniture and
clothing strewn about in the documentary footage, the man paints a strong image of these two
particular items that have become a part of his memory. In this description, they are no longer
random items scattered around nameless people, they are a chair that belonged to his family and
a sock that belonged to his brother. The images of this violent event become personal and more
concrete.
Similarly, the woman tells a number of anecdotes that personalize some of the themes of
the documentary footage. One of her most moving narrations is her description of her first love
and her subsequent abortion. In this story, she describes going to the university in Haifa where
she met her first love. She talks about learning rebellion and resistance but forgetting herself in
the process. She got pregnant and had an abortion, but developed an infection and confessed to
her family when she could not hide it any longer. However, she goes on to describe the
discussion her family had about what method they should use to kill her, though they eventually
decided on exile. Throughout the telling of this story, the woman describes her feelings of love,
fear, grief, shame, and guilt. This narrative involves themes that are dealt with more broadly in
the documentary footage and the film as a whole including the disruption of family life brought
about as the result of the rebellion. There are multiple scenes from the documentary footage that
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indicate an aberration in typical family activities. There are frequent images of markets that were
once open being closed and deserted because of the Israeli-army-imposed curfews on the cities.
Khleifi even includes images of women and children breaking curfew in Gaza in order to go to a
make-shift market and buy food because the city had been under curfew for days and the families
had begun to run out of food. As mundane an activity as going grocery shopping has been forced
into “criminal” (by Israeli standards) act, and the women forced into criminals, because of the
occupation and the intifada.
Another, perhaps more jarring, incident captured in the documentary footage is the scene
of a group of young boys, perhaps eight years old, who are playing a game with marbles, but
instead of marbles, they are using rubber bullets that they have found on the street. They tell the
camera that the soldiers confiscated their marbles, so now the best substitute is the rubber bullets.
One of the boys then goes on to show the camera a handful of different types of bullets and
describe the differences between them and what happens when someone is shot with one. This
scene is reminiscent of a child showing an adult a collection of marbles and describing the
difference between a Cat‟s Eye and an Oxblood marble. Even an activity as seemingly innocuous
as children playing marbles has been altered as the result of the Intifada. In both of these
instances, however, the subjects of the documentary footage remain unnamed and impersonal.
There is no mention of their feelings about these alterations to their daily activities except
annoyance and anger.
Unlike the subjects of the documentary footage, the woman‟s experience of the resistance
and love altered her in a more fundamental way and, as a result, caused her and her family more
pain and suffering. Because, under the thrall of her first love and her first exposure to the
resistance movement, she forgets herself and her family ties, she brings shame on her family,
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which results in her removal from them. As her family members discuss the possible ways to kill
her, the final method suggested was burning, which was met with the response: “how can they
burn you when the country is aflame?” The final decision is that she should be exiled, but this
quote indicates that, perhaps, the only reason she is alive is because the destruction caused by the
various rebellions renders her death a meaningless addition to the violence. Not only does the
intifada contribute to her loss of self, it also, to her benefit, disrupts the familial process of
meting out punishment for her behavior. However, unlike in the documentary footage, the viewer
learns of her feelings of fear, shame, and guilt, as well as her family‟s emotions during the
process of deciding how she should be punished. Her male relatives are angry and ashamed of
her behavior. He mother is overwhelmed with sorrow. This snapshot of how the occupation and
Intifada changes family relations is more personal than the images in the documentary footage
and offers a complexity of emotion for the viewer to experience rather than just generalized,
violent images. This scene might initially appear to contradict my assertion that the film
confirms the belief that Palestinians can do no wrong. Telmissany argues that Khleifi uses dual
critique throughout most of his films, including Canticle of the Stones (81-2), while Khleifi,
himself, and Kennedy both point out that Khleifi likes to engage with the traditional/modernity
internal critique (Kennedy 40; Khleifi and Alexander 33). While this scene is a critique of the
traditional Palestinian cultural norms of dealing with a rebellious daughter and shame, it is a
critique of the internal workings of Palestine, rather than external problems with the occupation.
While the occupation influences the family‟s decision, the process itself is not a result of the
occupation or resistance to it. Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s analysis of societal beliefs refers
specifically to behaviors that are related in some way to the conflict itself, so though individuals
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are still capable of wrong in their personal and family lives, Palestinian behavior regarding the
resistance is still considered right and just.
The couple also describes events they experienced together. The most prominent event
that they discuss is his arrest and imprisonment for fifteen years. They discuss their separation as
the result of his imprisonment several times throughout the film and each discussion highlights
the differences in their personal experiences of the same event. The first instance they discuss is
her decision to cut her hair. He mentions how he loved her long hair and often thought of the feel
and smell of it while he was in prison. However, she explains how she had to cut it in order to
erase her first love, who also loved her long hair, and “finish with the suffering of the second,”
him. Khleifi uses this scene to demonstrate that, though people may experience the same events,
they do so in different ways, and the events come to mean and symbolize different things for
different people.
However, unlike the scenes of the couple, the documentary footage focuses on joint
emotion and joint experiences. The first man interviewed in Gaza about the death of his son, for
instance, describes how Israeli soldiers raided his house in the middle of the night, killed one of
his sons, and took another with them. As he describes this scene he is angry, agitated, and
surrounded by a group of men from his community, and footage of him and the men is
interspersed with footage from around Gaza. As the man finishes his story, a man seated next to
him claims the same thing happened to his neighbor two days later and the soldiers returned to
blow up the neighbor‟s house a few weeks later. There is a focusing, in these scenes, on the
common experience. An individual tells his or her story but is quick to relate other stories just
like his or hers in order to show that the violence of the occupation is pervasive. The emotions
displayed during the telling of these stories, similarly, are ones that are shared by the group or
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community. In the documentary footage, the individuals never talk about their experiences in an
intimate or personal way and usually display sorrow or anger, which are usually shared by
everyone present at the filming.
Khleifi‟s insistence on including the intimate, personal account of the couple along with
the documentary style footage allows the film to capture both the pervasive and invasive nature
of the occupation for the whole of Palestinian society as well as the means by which individuals
cope with the violence thrust upon them by the war. He offers a rounded image of the Palestinian
experience of the occupation and Intifada that includes the psychological and emotional damage
of individuals as well as the structural damage to communities and family units. This rounded
image, in turn, demonstrates all the ways in which Palestinians are victimized by the violence
and disruption of the occupation.
The persistent use of violence throughout the film to demonstrate the various societal
beliefs that Rouhana and Bar-Tal claim are necessary during intractable interethnic conflicts and
the particular emphasis on displaying the Palestinians as the undisputed victims of Israeli
violence work to confirm the Palestinian simulacral narrative that is founded on those beliefs.
However, the reaffirmation of those beliefs, in this film, correlates with West‟s general
acceptance of the societal belief that the Palestinians are victims and the heavy use of visual
violence correlates with the presence of an organized resistance movement within Palestine. The
saturation of the media with images of Palestinian youths throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers who
are firing automatic weapons caused a shift in the hyperreality of the West. The overwhelming
presence of these images allowed the West to accept, for a time, one of the most important
aspects of the Palestinian simulacral narrative: that the Palestinians, and not the Israelis, are the
true victims of this conflict.
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Paradise Now
Paradise Now, though released sixteen years after Canticle of the Stones, examines some
of the political, economic, and psychological motivations of suicide bombers in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Hany Abu-Assad, however, approaches his film in a different stylistic
manner from Khleifi. While Khleifi uses contrast to establish the multiple levels of suffering of
the Palestinian population, Abu-Assad harnesses the general style of Hollywood thriller films.
Yaqub claims that the use of genre produces expectation in the audience (219). While she is
referring to the wedding and road film genres, the same can be said for Abu-Assad‟s use of the
thriller genre. The use of the thriller genre and Abu-Assad‟s choice of topic produces in the
viewer the expectation and “desire for the spectacle of terror, the desire to enjoy what is morally
reprehensible, and simultaneously disallows the spectacle from materializing before their eyes”
(Gana 36). Abu-Assad primarily uses lack of movement, of both the camera and characters, to
indicate the stagnation and loss of hope that enveloped much of the Palestinian population
following the collapse of the Oslo Accords and following the second Intifada. His film, unlike
Khleifi‟s, progresses chronologically and uses a single, consistent filming style for the entirety of
the film. Also unlike Canticle of the Stones, Paradise Now has very few visually violent scenes
despite the film‟s inherently violent subject. The violence of the occupation permeates the
content of the film, but on a predominantly verbal, through anecdotes and discussions, rather
than a visual level. Gana points out that Abu-Assad
makes use of cinematic conventions […] in order to undo the spectacle of
terrorism and to articulate a more nuanced and challenging narrative of
Palestinian nationhood, a narrative that has been so far both impermissible and\or
readily discreditable by the hegemonic system of Israeli occupation. (2)
It is important to mention, however, that the type of violence in Abu-Assad‟s film is different
from the type of violence in Khleifi‟s film which could account for at least some of the
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differences in treatment of violence in the films. As previously mentioned, the violence in
Khleifi‟s film is violence between resistance fighters and Israeli military, while the suggested
violence in Abu-Assad‟s is committed against civilians. The type of violence in Abu-Assad‟s
film is considered morally reprehensibly by many, particularly his Western audience, which very
well might have played a role in his decision to not actually show the final bombing. The second
Intifada was considerably more violent than the first. Palestinians, who had generally eschewed
guns and bombs in the first Intifada, took them up more regularly in the second. As a result of
the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, American and European public opinion was easily
swayed in support of any country who was the victim of suicide attacks and against any group
that used or encouraged suicide bombing—a conflation that Israel used to its advantage. Gana
points out the trouble of discussing suicide bombing after 9-11 and argues that if one is trying to
“interpret” terrorism, it is often conflated with condoning it (22) and that many avoided
discussing the complexity of terrorism or its contextual factors out of fear of humanizing suicide
bombers which ultimately “betrays […] an interest in their dehumanization” (25). Because the
hyperreality created by the media had been saturated with images and sound bites that linked
suicide bombing with evilness and anti-Americanism and further linked Palestinians to suicide
bombing, Palestinians were, once again, seen as the aggressors and the Israelis were seen as the
victims in Western media. This shift in the hyperreality created a shift in Western public opinion
in opposition to the Palestinian simulacral narrative. What is interesting, however, is that rather
than reaffirming the Palestinian simulacral narrative by reaffirming core societal beliefs like
Khleifi‟s film, Paradise Now actually rejects two societal beliefs that are critical in supporting
the Palestinian simulacral narrative: that Palestinians are always and only the victims in the
conflict and that Palestinians can do no wrong regarding the resistance of the occupation. Abu-
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Assad accomplishes this through the dialogue between characters regarding the appropriateness
of violent resistance.

Post 9/11 Shift in Hyperreality and Western Public Opinion
As previously stated, while, during the first Intifada, Palestinians primarily protested or
armed themselves with stones, during the second Intifada, the violence escalated (Gross Stein
224). During the mid and late 1990s, after the Oslo Accords failed to produce tangible results
and after the Goldstein massacre in 1994 left at least 29 Palestinians dead, extremist Palestinian
groups such as Hamas began using suicide bombing against Israel (Baxter and Akbarzadeh 1456). In response to the bombing, Israel further developed and tightened the enclosure system of
roadblocks, fences, and walls in Palestine which led to extreme economic restrictions on the
Palestinian population because neither goods nor people could cross the border easily
(Bornstein). As Israel‟s security and Palestine‟s economic situation deteriorated, the 2000 Camp
David Summit was a last-ditch effort to save the Oslo Accords. The attempt, however, failed,
and the tensions within Palestine continued to simmer.
The second Intifada, or al-Aqsa Intifada, began on September 28, 2000 when the then
candidate, but soon to be prime minister, Ariel Sharon, who was greatly disliked by many
Palestinians because of his role in permitting the 1982 massacre at the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps in Lebanon, visited the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinians rioted and the turmoil
quickly spread throughout the territory. During this uprising there were no images of adolescents
armed with stones facing Israeli tanks circulating in the media, and the West viewed it as just
another war. Palestinians had failed to alter the hyperreality produced by the Western media in
their favor. A year after its advent, in September of 2001, the al-Aqsa intifada lost whatever
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popular support it might have had in the United States and Europe after the September 11th attack
on the World Trade Center in New York City. Sharon, who won the election for Prime Minister
earlier that year, was quick to forge a good relationship with President Bush and even quicker to
conflate the attack in New York with the suicide bombings in Israel, which allowed Sharon to
couch the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the broader terms of Bush‟s “war on terrorism” (Baxter
and Akbarzadeh 150). The Western hyperreality was saturated with images and reports of
Palestinian suicide bombers who were instantly equated with the suicide bombers of 9/11, which
created a decisive shift in Western public opinion. Furthermore, Hamas, a group categorized by
the United States as a terrorist organization, was gaining popular support with Palestinians
because of Fatah‟s failure to achieve progress. Arafat also received a series of blows which lead
to his fall from grace in the West such as the IDF finding papers that indicated he personally
approved payments to the families of terrorists (Baxter and Akbarzadeh 150).
This new framing of the conflict also created the political need for the Palestinians to
distance themselves from images of violence, while the stagnation of the peace process and the
crumbling social and economic conditions provoke a psychological need to examine societal
beliefs. During the first Intifada, there was still hope and a possibility of success through
resistance. Because of the changing political and economic scenes, hope in Palestine is slim and
the living conditions of Palestinians worsen every day (Ajluni). The violent means of the second
Intifada only worsened conditions for the people without bringing any hope for resolution, only
promises of prolonged conflict, and Abu-Assad offers a film designed to make its viewers
question some of the societal beliefs of Palestinians. Though Israel‟s presence in Palestine is still
delegitimized and the goals of the Palestinians are still justified, the film actually works to break
the cycle of psychological defense mechanisms, which perpetuate the violence, by bringing into
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question the rightness of the actions of some Palestinians, namely suicide bombers, and the status
of Palestinians as strictly the victim.
The fact that Israel is still depicted as the illegitimate enemy and the Palestinian‟s goals
are presented as just is not surprising. Palestinians have legitimate grievances with the past and
present behavior of Israel and their goals of self-determination and an independent state are,
from most points of view, justifiable. Unlike in Canticle of the Stones, however, the means by
which Abu-Assad reinforces these societal beliefs are not by displaying visceral violence, but by
depicting the spatial and economic violence that the Israeli enclosure system inflicts on the
Palestinian population. The film opens with Suha, played by Lubna Azabal, crossing a
checkpoint and having to walk around an Israeli roadblock in Nablus. Checkpoints and
roadblocks, though present before, were increased throughout the Occupied Territories in the
period following the Oslo Accords. In the name of security, Israel made travel from the
Occupied Territories to Israel and travel within Palestine difficult for most Palestinians and
nearly impossible for certain demographics (Arnon 587). These road blocks and checkpoints are
routinely subjected to arbitrary closings and Palestinians are often refused passage or harassed
for no apparent reason (Bornstein). The result of this closure system was the economic strangling
of the West Bank. Because of their prominence in daily life, roadblocks are also often used in
films made during this time period. Films like Abu-Assad‟s Rana’s Wedding and Suleiman‟s
Divine Intervention, as well as others, center key events around road blocks and closed off space
in an attempt to recreate harmonious space out of the now even more fragmented landscape of
Palestine (Gertz and Khleifi Palestinian Cinema 134-70).
It is difficult to find work in Palestine and it is difficult to legally obtain passage to Israel,
even for work. As a result unemployment levels and poverty are continually increasing (Roy).
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Abu-Assad captures this phenomenon in a number of different scenes. When Said, played by
Kais Nashif, learns that he will be going on the suicide mission, he tells his mother, played by
Haim Abbass, that he will be going to Israel for a job interview. She is pleased, but surprised,
and mentions how difficult it is for a young man Said‟s age to obtain a work visa for Israel. She
also makes sure to remind Said to tell his boss where he is going because it was lucky for Said
that he was able to find work in Palestine at all. During his final speech, Said mentions that he
has only been outside of the West Bank once in his entire life and that was only because he
needed surgery. The enclosure system not only restricts human movement, but also the
movement and availability of necessary goods. This process is reflected in the film by the
repeated mention of the price of water filters. Israel controls most of the water resources in the
West Bank and the water in many of the Palestinian cities requires filtering. In the film, everyone
from the radio station, to the cab drivers, to Said and Khaled, played by Ali Suliman, mention
something about the high priced water filters and where to find the cheapest ones. These
instances are examples of the injustices of the Israeli occupation which work to delegitimize the
Israeli presence in the West Bank. At the same time these instances also work as reasons for the
justification of the Palestinian goal of a state free of Israeli interference. In this way, Abu-Assad
leaves the core societal belief that Israel is the enemy and Palestine is just relatively undisturbed.
However, Abu-Assad does go on to challenge two of the other primary societal beliefs.
During an interview, Abu-Assad, who faced accusations of justifying and promoting
violence and terrorism after the film‟s release, addresses this topic directly and claims that:
If you see the film, it‟s fairly obvious that it does not condone the taking of
lives.[…] The full weight and complexity of the situation is impossible to show
on film. No one side can claim a moral stance because taking any life is not a
moral action. The entire situation is outside of what we can call morality. (7)
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While Abu-Assad calls into question the “rightness” of Palestinian actions, he does so in an
ambivalent way through Suha and Said. As previously mentioned, Abu-Assad represents,
through these two characters, the two general approaches of resistance to the occupation:
violence and non-violence. Rather than take an obvious side, however, Abu-Assad lets the
characters point out the problems with both violent and nonviolent methods of conflict
resolution. This approach is perhaps best illustrated in the scene where, while trying to find the
other members of the group after the first attempt at the mission failed, Said quickly fixes Suha‟s
car and his watch is broken in the process. He hands the watch to Suha while he looks at her car
and she lays it on the car. When he is done looking at the car, he, inadvertently, slams the hood
of the car down on the watch, breaking it. Suha, who was supposed to be taking care of the watch
while Said worked, insists on fixing it, though Said tells her that it does not matter. When they
take the watch to a shop to have it fixed, Suha becomes upset about the martyr and collaborator
videos, and she and Said leave without giving the shop owner specific instructions about the
watch. Said ushers Suha out of the shop and leaves the watch. In her article, Yaqub argues that
cars in Paradise Now are symbols of the troubled Palestinian society (224-5). Suha and Said,
symbols of nonviolent and violent resistance respectively, both contribute to breaking the watch,
which could be interpreted as a symbol of time and progress, while trying to fix the car, a symbol
of troubled society. While Suha insists on trying to fix the watch by taking the watch to a repair
shop, where they can find a supposed expert at fixing such problems, after arriving at the shop,
she becomes so distracted by the lack of respect and opportunistic behavior of the shop owner,
who is arguably symbolic of the United States, that she forgets about the watch entirely and Said
is able to shuffle her out of the shop without making plans to repair the watch. This reading is
reflective of the Peace Process in general and indicates that both the nonviolent and violent
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resistance movements share some blame in the break-down of progress; violent resistance
movements by giving Israel an excuse not to come to the negotiating table and non-violent
resistance movements by, according to some, continuing to participate in a process that has failed
to produce results and that is biased towards the Israelis. The rest of the film elaborates on these
roles.

The Resistance Debate and Societal Beliefs
Throughout the film, Abu-Assad uses lack of camera movement, symbolism, and
character dialogue to demonstrate the stagnation and hopelessness of everyday life in Palestine
and the fracture in the Palestinian population and leadership over the best way to proceed with or
settle the conflict. Rather than use images of violence, however, Abu-Assad treats the topic of
violent resistance as a whole and addresses both sides of the debate throughout the film. Suha,
who grew up in diaspora, comes to represent progress and a peaceful solution to the conflict
while Said comes to represent the opposite—stagnation and prolonged violence. Through these
characters and their debate, Abu-Assad contradicts two of the core societal beliefs that are part of
the Palestinian simulacral narrative: the role of Palestinians as victims, and the justness of
Palestinian actions.
Suha, the primary female role in the film, has returned to Palestine after a life in diaspora.
She was born in Morroco and educated in France, but her father, Abu-Azzam, was a famous
Palestinian martyr. Khaled and Said respect her because of her father‟s sacrifice, but they
generally do not agree with her politically. Though the viewer is first introduced to her as a
potential love-interest for Said, her second appearance and subsequent conversation with Said
demonstrate that she is far from just a pretty face. Yacub argues that the female characters in
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Paradise Now act as the “bearers of culture and sustainers of life” (222) but that they are only
marginally effective (222). She goes on to argue that the failed relationship between Said and
Suha is a “manifestation of the sterility of the community from which Palestinian culture and
politics should (but cannot) arise” (223). While Yacub offers convincing analysis as to why the
two male characters‟ mothers are symbols of culture, her labeling of Suha as a symbol of culture
is a little more problematic. Suha lives alone, travels alone, and grew up in Europe and
Morocco—away from the culture in Palestine. Labeling Suha as a bearer of culture is difficult
when she behaves so differently from the other women in the film. However, Suha is emblematic
as a sustainer of life because the argument her character makes, verbally and symbolically, is in
favor of preserving life during the conflict. In this sense, perhaps her failed relationship with
Said is a symbolic of the failure the proponents of violent resistance and the proponents of nonviolent resistance to present a unified front against the occupation.
The first scene that indicates her and Said‟s opposing stances is the scene in which Said,
who has learned of his suicide mission, tries to slip the key to Suha‟s car under her door in the
middle of the night, since he knows he will not be returning to the shop the next day. She,
however, is still awake and opens the door as he is trying to slip the key under. She invites him in
and they discuss a few topics before he brings up her father and the resistance. Unlike Khaled
and Said, Suha does not agree with her father‟s politics of violent resistance. She argues that
Palestine must admit it has no military might when compared to Israel in order to find more
peaceful means of settling the conflict. This brief conversation defines Suha‟s and Said‟s roles
for the rest of the film. Suha, with her West African and European upbringing, makes the
argument for peaceful resistance and negotiations from the point of view of Palestinians in
diaspora and as a surviving family member of a resistance fighter. Her point of view, not having

36
grown up in Palestine and under the oppression of the occupation, is quite different from Said
and Khaled‟s, both of whom suffer on a daily basis at the hands of the occupation, have lost faith
and hope in peaceful negotiations, and belong to a lower socioeconomic class. Her arguments
cause Said to waiver briefly on whether or not to follow through with the bombing, and he even
goes so far as to question Jamal about Heaven and ask Khalid whether or not they are doing the
right thing. However, in the end, her arguments are not enough to sway Said from his mission.
Later in the film, she fleshes out the argument for non violent resistance during a
conversation with Khaled, after she learns what the two men plan to do. She tells Khaled, “If you
can kill and die for equality, you should be able to find a way to be equal in life,” and that if they
continue with violence there is “no difference between victim and occupier.” She asks Khaled:
And what about us? The ones who remain? Will we win that way? Don‟t you see
that what you‟re doing is destroying us? And that you give Israel an excuse to
carry on? […] We have to turn it into a moral war. (Paradise Now)
Though Khaled argues against her in this conversation, he eventually heeds her words and
decides against fulfilling the suicide mission. The key difference between Suha and the two men
is her maintenance of hope. She has not personally experienced the daily economic and spatial
restrictions that the two men have and, as a result, is still invigorated at the idea of successful
peaceful negotiations. While she is able to convince Khaled, Said is too jaded by his personal
history with the Israelis and feels a personal need to counter his father‟s collaborative actions.
Her words cannot undo the past for Said and he feels the need to make up for his father‟s short
comings by continuing the resistance where his father undermined it.
Though Abu-Assad is careful not to blatantly argue one side over the other, Suha, who is
associated with nonviolent resistance and peaceful negotiations, is also associated with
movement and hope. She is one of the few characters who is routinely shown moving within the
frame of the camera. When she moves, the camera moves with her. When other characters are

37
around her, they move more. By associating her with movement, the film associates Suha and
her political stance with progress. She smiles and makes jokes. She, unlike most of the other
characters, is full of life and hope. However, in several instances, her optimism is checked by the
harsh realities of the occupation, and, as she cries and stares at the photo of Said while he travels
to Israel to complete his mission, the viewer is left to wonder what effect this harsh dose of the
realities of the occupation will have on her, according Khaled, naive optimism.
Abu-Assad primarily uses Said to make the argument in favor of violent resistance to the
Israeli occupation. Kennedy argues that “it is the inability of parents to protect or even provide
for their children that has politicized the younger generation,” which, at least in part, accounts for
the presence of higher numbers of young people in more recent Palestinian film (45). It would
appear that, for Said, this is, in fact, the case. Said is haunted and humiliated by his family‟s past.
His father was executed as a collaborator when he was a child, and Said and his family have had
to bear the brunt of the humiliation of his father‟s actions. In the opening scene, the disgruntled
customer references the incident when he says to Said that the bumper is “crooked like your
father.” It is a family history that Said cannot escape much like the Nakba and Naksa are social
histories that are woven into Palestinian identity and cannot be easily escaped. Because of this
personal history, Said is more committed to the suicide mission than Khaled. When Suha‟s
arguments threaten to change his mind, his memories of his father and the humiliation he has
faced as a result of his father‟s actions reaffirm his initial decision.
The speech he gives before he is sent to complete his mission is his strongest argument
for violent resistance, though it is still the result of the hopelessness inflicted upon him by the
occupation. In this speech, he argues that life in Nablus is like life imprisonment and that the
Israelis exploit peoples‟ weaknesses and turn them into collaborators, and “by doing that, they
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not only kill the resistance, they also ruin families, ruin their dignity and ruin an entire people.”
He claims that the Israelis must understand that “a life without dignity is worthless. Especially
when it reminds you, day after day, of humiliation and weakness.” Though he has a personal
shame that is not shared by all Palestinians, Said points out that the daily life in Palestine is filled
with indignity and humiliation which cannot be tolerated forever without enduring consequences
on the Palestinian population. Whereas Suha claims the violence and deaths of the resistance are
tearing the Palestinians apart, Said maintains that the daily humiliation is the actual culprit
responsible for destroying the lives of Palestinians. Both he and the other members of the group
in charge of orchestrating the suicide bombing say, repeatedly, that life under occupation is
equivalent to death. For Said, who has lived in Nablus his entire life, suffered the humiliation of
having a collaborator as a father, and has virtually no prospects for upward social or financial
mobility, life under the occupation is static and hopeless, which is why he chooses to end his in
the desperate hope that the resistance will at least carry on fighting against the injustice, even if
they have little hope of ever winning their freedom.
Contrary to Suha, Said is associated throughout the film with stillness. When filming
Said, the camera is almost always stationary and Said does not move much or move quickly in
most shots. However, there are several scenes in the film in which Abu-Assad slowly zooms the
camera in on Said‟s face: when Said is lying in bed after discovering that he and Khaled have
been chosen for the suicide mission, when he is considering detonating the bomb at the bus stop
in Israel, when he is wiping sweat from around the bomb taped to his abdomen, when he is
giving his final soliloquy, and when he is about to detonate the bomb at the end of the film. Each
of these scenes is a crucial moment in which Said is making his decisions. He is utterly still
while the camera zooms towards his unblinking eyes, indicating that these are not rash decisions
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on his part. The association of Said with stillness and stagnation is not surprising. His life, along
with many of the Palestinians living under the Israeli occupation, is languishing. However, the
association also extends to his political stance. He is, after all, the suicide bomber who
accomplishes his task. As a result, the violent approach to the occupation is also associated with
stasis and inactivity. While Said does, in the end, act, he does so not to bring an end to the
occupation or to progress towards a resolution. He simply acts in the hope of continuing the
resistance with the full knowledge that his death will mean little to the struggle as a whole. He
acts for the sake of acting without any hope of change or progress.
Throughout the film, Abu-Assad uses Said and the other proponents of violent resistance
to criticize peaceful methods of conflict resolution both verbally and symbolically. The film
makes the argument that many of those who argue for peaceful resistance do not understand the
severity of the situation in Palestine, that freedom requires struggle and sacrifice, and that
injustice must be fought because Israel will not end the occupation unless forced to do so. When
Said and Suha are talking in the car after leaving the watch-repair shop, Said tells her that his
father was a collaborator and that the whole world knows it. When she apologizes and says she
did not know, he tells her, “What do you know? You come from a different world. Abu Azzam‟s
daughter, living in a fancy neighborhood.” He points out that she has been relatively unaffected
by the occupation because she did not grow up under it, and because she belongs to a difference
economic class, she has not felt the economic effects of the occupation as strongly as the lower
classes. In doing so, though, Said also dismisses the loss that Suha has suffered: growing up
without a father. Khaled makes the argument that many organizations and individuals who
advocate peaceful negotiations have no real experience of life under occupation and their
approach is considered naïve by many who advocate violent struggle. As Khaled later tells Suha,
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“Don‟t be so naïve. There can be no freedom without struggle.” This phrase and theme crop up
repeatedly throughout the film and are an accusation against those who denounce violent
resistance of not doing enough to end the occupation. Khaled and Said also make the proviolence argument that Israel will not end the occupation unless they are forced to do so, and,
therefore, the injustice of the occupation must be fought. There are many political analysts who
suggest that continued occupation, despite its costliness, is the preferred option for Israel who
wishes to maintain control of the land between the 1967 border and the Jordan River without
granting citizenship to its Palestinian population, an act which would create a majority of Arabs
in the Jewish state (Smith 250 and Shlaim 255). Many Palestinians who advocate violence do so
because the peace process has brought nothing but more and worse misery to the populations
living in the West Bank and Gaza (Arnon). Settling with the Israelis, to Said, is the equivalent of
accepting the injustices of the past. Peaceful means, according to Said, do not do enough to fight
this injustice or to bring an end to the occupation. The pro-violence faction of Palestinian
society, according to the interpretation of this film, claims that the nonviolent faction of
Palestinians is naïve, not capable of bringing an end to the occupation, and threaten to accept
injustice.
Suha, on the other hand, criticizes and denounces violent approaches to solving the
conflict. Abu-Assad argues, through Suha, that the goals of suicide bombers are not valid, the
violence they create gives Israel an excuse to continue the occupation, using violence makes
Palestinians no worse than the Israelis, and violent resistance causes damage to Palestinian
society as well. While arguing with Khaled, Suha claims “if you can kill and die for equality, you
should be able to find a way to be equal in life.” With this statement, she argues that the
proponents of violent resistance, particularly suicide bombers, have the wrong goal. The ultimate
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goal of the resistance should not be to find equality no matter the cost, but to find a way to live as
equals costing as few lives as possible. Suha also argues on two different occasions within the
film that violent resistance on the part of the Palestinians gives Israel an excuse to continue the
occupation and violence against the Palestinian population. This argument takes into
consideration that Israel‟s primary excuse for the occupation and almost all of their military
decisions is that they are in the best interest of Israel‟s security. The wall, the roadblocks, the
checkpoints, the occupation itself were all done in order to “protect” Israel from the perceived
threat of Palestinian violence (Smith 240). Suha also points out this cyclical nature of violence
when she argues that “if you kill, there‟s no difference between victim and occupier.” AbuAssad further highlights this similarity between suicide bombing and the occupation in the scene
where Said considers detonating his bomb at a bus stop in Israel after the plan has gone awry.
The camera scans the other people waiting for the bus and focuses on the women and children.
This inclusion of images of the innocent almost-victims makes even Said question the
“rightness” of his planned actions. Later in the film Suha asks Khaled “and what about us?[ …]
Don‟t you see that what you‟re doing is destroying us?” This is perhaps one of her strongest
points as it calls into question the effect that violent resistance has on Palestinian society as a
whole. Abu-Assad further supports this point by including images of Suha, Said‟s mother, and
an emotionally distraught Khaled before cutting to the scene of Said, sitting on the Israeli bus,
surrounded by soldiers and civilians waiting to detonate himself. Suha and, later, the images of
Khaled, make the argument that violent resistance causes devastation within Palestinian families
and the community as a whole and that this damage is just as bad, if not worse, than the damage
caused by the occupation itself. Both of these characters point out the problems and wrongs of
the opposite group which demonstrates that Palestinians, as a whole, are no longer capable of

42
doing no wrong in regards to resisting the occupation. This is a phenomenon that Asu-Assad and
his film crew experienced in Nablus while filming. In an interview, he explains that
We had to report our whereabouts to these armed Palestinian factions behind the
backs of the Israeli Army, without the Israeli Army knowing we were in contact
with the Palestinians, because getting in and out of Nablus was difficult enough as
it was. On top of this, the rivalry between Palestinian factions meant approval
from one faction and meant definite disapproval from the other. (Abu-Assad 5)
The rival Palestinian factions created just as many problems for Abu-Assad and his crew as the
Israeli army. In fact, one of the factions kidnapped one of his crew members which caused the
team to finish filming in studio (Abu-Assad). This is a real-life example of the moral confusion
and chaos that the film depicts. Because of the extreme circumstances of the occupation and
resistance, Palestinians are no longer given the option of making definitively right or wrong
choices regarding the struggle, thus the societal belief that Palestinians can do no wrong is
brought into question.
Abu-Assad also challenges the societal belief that Palestinians are always and only the
victims in this conflict. As previously mentioned, both Israelis and Palestinians have cultural
identities that are based on a history of victimization. This sense of victimization is the result of
the competing national simulacral narratives. The Holocaust is a foundational event for Israeli
identity since it was overwhelmingly traumatic and sparked mass immigration to Palestine, while
this mass immigration of European Jews and the subsequent expulsion of Palestinians from most
of their land is a foundational event for the Palestinian population. It is this sense of
victimization that creates an unwillingness to compromise in both parties—since both parties feel
they, the victim, have already suffered enough (Rouhana and Bar-Tal). In the film, Said
explicitly mentions this phenomenon and calls into question its logic in his final speech:
Even worse, [the Israelis have] convinced the world and themselves that they are
the victims. How can that be? How can the occupier be the victim? If they take on
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the role of oppressor and victim, then I have no other choice but to also be a
victim and a murder as well. (Paradise Now)
In this quote, Said points out Israel‟s failure to recognize its role in producing the conditions that
create the suicide bombers that it spends so much time defending itself against and admits that
Palestinians are also both victims and aggressors. The victim mentality of both parties produces
defensive and retaliatory behavior that provokes more defensive and retaliatory behavior in the
other party. The violence is a cyclical, self perpetuating phenomenon (Rouhana and Bar-Tal).
Said, however, recognizes this cycle and still decides to perpetuate the violence because he can
find no other way to make an impact on the occupation and can no longer tolerate the injustice of
the occupation. While Brand claims that, in Paradise Now, “the way out of victimhood is not by
resisting its oppression but yielding to it completely. Identification with pure victimhood results
in an act of pure violence and an „achievement‟ of paradise” (170), I would disagree. In the
previously mentioned monologue, Said clearly admits his role of both victim and aggressor, so
he is not purely identified with victimhood and acknowledges the same phenomenon that Brand
discusses in his article. Brand also lumps Khalid and Suha, who also live in this world where
“the only remaining act of self-assertion is to choose one‟s own death” (170), into a group with
Said, and Khaled and Suha actually function in the film to counteract such claims.
By contradicting these two core societal beliefs, Paradise Now also calls into question the
Palestinian simulacral narrative which rests so heavily on societal beliefs. This rejection of
certain societal beliefs happens to correlate with the rejection of the Palestinian simulacral
narrative in Western, particularly U.S., public opinion while the lack of violence in the films
correlates with the lack of an organized resistance movement at the time of filming. Western
opinion turned against the Palestinian simulacral narrative as the result of the saturation of
western media with images that connected suicide bombing of any sort with anti-American and
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anti-Western sentiments and terrorism. Palestinians were linked to terrorism because of the
continued use of suicide bombing by extremist groups and Israel was able to gain sympathy from
the West.
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Chronicle of a Disappearance and Divine Intervention
In Chronicle of a Disappearance and Divine Intervention, Elia Suleiman takes a different
stylistic approach than Khleifi or Abu-Assad. Suleiman‟s films are a collection of scenes that
chronicle, more or less, the time that the main character, ES, spends in Jerusalem, Nazareth, and
the West Bank. Suleiman uses little narrative in these films and the narrative that does exist
works to explain and justify the fantasy scenes that are included. These fantasy scenes in the
latter film are often violent and, as a result, the narrative threads in Divine Intervention are
stronger than those of Chronicle of a Disappearance. In Chronicle of a Disappearance, the
narrative strands are loose. Many scenes are presented and produce a mental image of daily life
in Palestine, but the only story-line Suleiman conveys is of ES, the walkie-talkie, and Adan,
played by Ola Tabari, who attempts to find housing in Jerusalem and subsequently takes a
fantasy revenge via the stolen walkie-talkie. This narrative strand is used to situate and explain
the fantasy scenes. It is also used to confirm Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s four societal beliefs.
Chronicle of a Disappearance, filmed and produced during the mid 1990s when the idea of
Palestinians as the victims of Israel was waning in Western public opinion, contains little
violence, and, because it was filmed during the years of relative peace following the Oslo
Accords, it only weakly reinforces the Palestinian simulacral narrative and ideological societal
beliefs. The violence in Divine Intervention, produced during the second Intifada when
Palestinians were widely equated with terrorists in general, works to confirm some and reject
others of the four core societal beliefs, but does so in a different way than Khleifi‟s film because
the violence Suleiman depicts in his films is antagonistic and humorous. When asked about his
reasons for the use of violence in Divine Intervention Suleiman explained:
I sponge up the realities around me. […]You could say that Chronicle depicts the calm
before the storm […] But in this latest film[, Divine Intervention,] things broke loose.
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There‟s a total breakdown in communication, and the occupation is far more evident[…]
If Chronicle is the silence before the storm, Divine Intervention is the very early stages of
a volcanic eruption, before it actually spews lava, but where you can see the sparks and
all the warning signs that you have to evacuate immediately” (64-5).
However, though his later film contains more visual violence, both of his films, unlike Canticle
of the Stones and Paradise Now, are dark comedies, and the violence that he depicts in his later
film is so outlandish that it actually counters the view that Palestinians could present any real
threat to Israeli security, rather than substantiating the claim. In Divine Intervention, Suleiman
uses violence and the presence, or lack thereof, of narrative strands to confirm the beliefs that
Palestinians are the victims, Israel is illegitimate, and the goals of the resistance movement are
just but rejects the belief that Palestinians can do no wrong.

Chronicle of a Disappearance
The 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles, seemed to mark a
new milestone in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with both of the ruling parties, Israel‟s Labor
party and the PLO‟s Fatah party, coming together to sign a phased plan for peace. However,
right wing religious extremists on either side of the conflict rejected the accords and used the
opportunity to carry out violent terror attacks (Baxter and Akbarzadeh 145-6). These attacks and
the consolidation rather than the dissolution of the occupation began to have a negative impact
on the image of the Palestinians in the West. The fact that the PLO supported Iraq in the first
Gulf War did not help the Palestinian international reputation in the West. During this time
period, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas as well as other groups began launching more
frequent suicide bombing attacks against the Israeli populace, which gave Israel an excuse to
develop and tighten the enclosure system. While there were some Jewish extremists practicing
similar terrorist tactics, the chief violence committed by Israel against the Palestinians was an
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economic violence (Ajluni). This economic violence requires explanations, and, unlike the
Palestinian suicide bombings, Israel‟s enclosure system and the devastating effects it had on the
Palestinian economy cannot be readily summarized and illustrated by photographs and sound
bites. As a result, the public opinion of the West began to drift away from the concept of
Palestinians as victims. This neutrality, or slight negativity, in Western public opinion coincides
with a lack of visual violence and weak support for Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s four core societal
beliefs in Chronicle of a Disappearance. Unlike Canticle of the Stones, which also supports all
four beliefs, Suleiman‟s film supports them in less obvious ways and with less vigor than
Khleifi‟s film.
The first half of Chronicle of a Disappearance, “Jerusalem Personal Diary,” is presented
as a personal video diary of the main character, ES. The only device that indicates the passing of
time is an occasional clip of a computer screen on which is typed “the following day” in Arabic.
This section of the film does not have a narrative thread beyond the occasional indication from
the computer screen that days are passing. Most of the scenes Suleiman includes could be taking
place at any time of day on any day of the week and, rather than work to produce a cohesive
series of events, the images work to produce a larger cohesive image of daily life in Palestine.
The scene of his father at work, his mother visiting a friend with relatives, The Holy Land shop,
and the fishermen are all scenes of daily activity. There is nothing fantastical about them and
they do not fit together in such a way as to produce anything that could traditionally be called a
plot line. The character, ES, is also silent throughout both Chronicle of a Disappearance and
Divine Intervention. Salti claims that bearing witness has been a driving force for the Palestinian
arts since the 1960s (51) and compares Suleiman‟s ES to al-Ali‟s Handhalah. Handhalah is a
cartoon character who is drawn as a child in tattered clothes, with his back always to the reader,
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who witnesses horrific events, but never comments on them. His sole purpose it to bear witness
to the events. Salti argues that ES is an adult version who is more complex and compels the
viewer to witness and speak about what he or she sees, since ES cannot (51-2). There is also no
real violence in the first half of the film, though the scenes in front of the café come close. These
scenes, which are repeated with different vehicles and occupants, involve a car stopping in front
of the café and both passengers stepping out of the car arguing and fighting. However, despite
the shouting and pushing, these two men are always subdued by the occupants of the café, settled
back in the car, and continue on their journey. Any real violence or bloodshed is always averted
and the little scuffles require no explanation from a narrative.
The second half of the film, “Jerusalem Political Diary,” is, literally, another story. In this
half of the film, Palestinians are still depicted as victims of Israeli policy. Because the film takes
place in Jerusalem, which Israel does not consider occupied territory, the most apparent
victimization occurs in the form of discrimination against Arabs in search of housing in
Jerusalem. Early in this half, ES goes to an estate agent to try to find an apartment where he
overhears the agent refusing to help a young woman, Adan, and encouraging her to either stay
with her family or get married if she wants to find decent housing. The real estate agent refuses
to even bother trying to help her find housing. This scene is followed by a scene of the girl
making phone calls to potential landlords in an attempt to find a place to live in West Jerusalem.
Each phone call begins with the landlord assuming, because she has little or no Arab accent, she
is Jewish and being helpful and optimistic until he or she realizes that Adan, is Arab at which
time he or she refuse to rent Adan the space. She is repeatedly denied housing simply because
she is Arab. While this instance of discrimination is not as strong an image of the Palestinian-asvictim as the images of suffering Palestinians in Khleifi‟s film, Adan is still the victim of
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circumstances beyond her control. As a result, the image does reinforce the societal belief that
Palestinians are the true victims in this conflict.
The fact that Palestinians are still portrayed as victims in Chronicle of a Disappearance
works towards confirming the other three societal beliefs mentioned by Rouhana and Bar-Tal:
that Israel is illegitimate, that the Palestinians‟ goals are just, and that the Palestinians can do no
wrong. The institutionalized racism in the housing market works to delegitimize Israel, which
claims to be a democracy that treats all of its citizens equally. While every nation falls somewhat
short of such lofty ideals, these discriminatory practices are ingrained in Israeli society to the
degree that the estate agent, presumably a reliable source of information in his field, refuses to
even bother with Adan‟s search for a home. He is aware of the futility of such a search for a
single Arab woman in Jerusalem and will not waste his time. The acceptance of such
discrimination as an insurmountable fact by a professional in the housing field highlights the
degree to which Israel falls short of its lofty ideal even within its own borders, much less in the
territory it occupies. As a result, Israel is portrayed as somewhat illegitimate. However, again,
the portrayal of this societal belief is not as strong as the images Khleifi produces using visual
violence.
Adan‟s goal, to find an apartment, appears to be such an innocuous goal that it requires
little justification. The young woman is simply searching for a place to live, which is a fairly
common occurrence in most parts of the world. However, the event becomes politically charged
in Israel and the West Bank where who resides on what land has become a tremendous obstacle
to peace. In the second half of the film, ES stumbles upon where Adan has been living, a small
dressing room in the theater where she works and where the walkie-talkie eventually settles,
though it is unclear how she came to posses it. She does not appear to have political motives for
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moving to the west side of Jerusalem, but her search for a home is thwarted by a racist policy in
the housing market. As a result, her goals appear justified while Israeli estate policy is
delegitimized.
The narrative strand continues into the fantasy scene where the girl orders the Israeli
police around the city. The fantasy scene, which roughly begins when the young woman takes
possession of the walkie-talkie, is somewhat ambiguous. Suleiman does not clarify who, exactly,
is fantasizing. ES could be fantasizing on behalf of the woman, since the viewer never sees him
give her the walkie-talkie. On the other hand, the woman goes to sleep and wakes back up before
beginning her walkie-talkie charade, so it could be her dream and her fantasy. This ambiguity is
only an indication that the fantasy is important, not the one who is fantasizing. The fantasy,
however, only has meaning in relation to the Palestinian narrative and the woman‟s struggle to
find housing. Without these two background elements, the fantasy scene would appear as a mere
childish prank. She acts out her frustration at not being treated fairly by initiating the ruse, but
she also politicizes the act. She makes remarks into the walkie-talkie such as “Oslo is not
coming” and “Oslo is not even calling” that indicate her disillusion with the Oslo Accords and
the peace process‟s inability to produce results. This politicization elevates the ploy to the level
of an act of resistance against Israel, as well as the U.S. and the P.A. who all participated in the
Oslo Accords which led to not only a continuation of the occupation, but also a worsening of
living conditions. Bresheeth points out that Adan derives her power from transgressing boundary
lines—by taking up the voice and position of the occupier. While ES disappears through silence,
she finds power in appropriating the Israeli accent and national anthem (Bresheeth 76, 80) and
must adopt some of the enemy‟s methods in order to take action (81-82). Though it is a primarily
nonviolent act of resistance, such a fantasy still bears justification which Suleiman offers prior to
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the fantasy scene via the young woman‟s struggle to find housing. The final societal belief that
Palestinians can do no wrong, is not strongly endorsed by the film but it is also not contradicted.
The Palestinian characters do not commit any crimes against each other or Israel in Chronicle of
a Disappearance. Even in the fantasy, the woman only causes confusion—no one is hurt and no
lasting harm is done. As a result the film generally supports the ideological conviction, if only
because it does not counter it in any way.

Divine Intervention
While Chronicle of a Disappearance avoids the use of visually violent footage, Divine
Intervention, produced in 2002, uses violence throughout the film. Divine Intervention was
produced during some of the most violent years of the second Intifada. As previously mentioned,
the September 11 attacks in New York had a profound impact on media images and international
public opinion of both American and international media. After 9/11, any suicide bombing was a
heinous terrorist act, no explanations needed or accepted. Because Palestinian groups frequently
used suicide bombings against Israel leading up to and during the second Intifada, Palestinians
were perceived as enemies in the United States‟ “War on Terror,” no questions asked. While the
broader international opinion was not quite as harsh, the public image of Palestine was tarnished,
and Palestinians were equated with violent terrorism. Because of this shift in the Western public
opinion, Israel was able to justify tightening its enclosure system in the West Bank in the name
of national security and the War on Terror (Baxter and Akbazadeh 150). Israel, unlike Palestine,
was able to create an atmosphere of sympathy with the United States and, to a lesser degree,
Europe. This sympathy allowed the media to create a hyperreality that was sympathetic to the
concept of Israel as the victim of Palestinian terrorists. This rejection of the concept of the
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Palestinians as victim, a rejection of the Palestinian simulacral narrative, coincides with Divine
Intervention‟s rejection of one of Rouhana and Bar-Tal‟s core societal beliefs: that Palestinians
can do no wrong.
Divine Intervention, which involves more fantasy scenes and more violence, has even
stronger narrative threads than the second half of Chronicle of a Disappearance. In Divine
Intervention, there are two dominant, narrative threads that involve ES: his father‟s illness and
death and his relationship with the woman. His father‟s illness is portrayed as the result of the
Israeli government seizing his father‟s shop and belongings. The first half hour of the film is
devoted to following the mundane activities of ES‟s father and the auditing and repossession of
his business, car, and other belongings, after which he suffers what is most likely a heart attack
or stroke, both of which are illnesses that can be aggravated by stress. The remainder of this
narrative strand consists of ES‟s visits to his father in the hospital, his father‟s death, and the
final scene of the film where he is shown sitting with his mother, watching a pressure cooker
steam. The other dominant narrative strand involves ES‟s relationship with a young woman,
played by Manal Khader, whom he meets at the al-Ram checkpoint between Ramallah and
Jerusalem. She is unable to cross the border to visit ES in Jerusalem, so they meet on the
Ramallah-side of the checkpoint in order to spend time together. ES eventually devises a plan to
sneak her across the border, but once at his home, she becomes disgusted with his neighbor, who
collaborates with the Israeli police, and leaves ES. He continues to go to the check point, but she
no longer meets him there. While there is much more going on in Divine Intervention, these two
narrative strands, which are interwoven with other images and micro narratives, provide the
foundation for the three violent fantasy scenes: the exploding tank, the collapsing tower, and the
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shooting range. These three scenes are highly politicized but rely on the narrative for
personalization and justification of the violence and confirm or reject societal beliefs.
The first of these scenes to occur also happens to be the first scene in which ES appears.
It directly follows the scene in which ES‟s father has a heart attack or stroke and opens with ES
driving to the hospital to visit his father. He sits in the car, eating what appears to be a peach.
When he finishes the peach, he throws the pit out of the window where it strikes and blows up an
Israeli tank in a spectacularly large explosion. This scene appears approximately one third of the
way through the film and after Suleiman has established the injustices of the Israeli government
in Nazareth, where his father lives. While there are no blood and no body parts to be seen in the
explosion, the explosion itself is a violent act of resistance. This violent fantasy, however, is
justified within the film by the knowledge that ES, stoic though he may be, is on his way to visit
his father who is dying after being persecuted by Israeli government officials. The scene also
works to demonstrate Israel‟s illegitimacy. This scene is obviously not meant to be realistic,
considering that a peach pit has no explosive power on its own. The pit, also called a stone, could
be construed as a symbol of Palestine since nectarines are grown in the area and stones are a well
established symbol of Palestine in literature and poetry (Parmenter). The image of a peach pit
causing the destruction of a heavily fortified Israeli tank and ES tossing it, the act of tossing
being a gesture associated with the Palestinian Freedom Fighter (Salti 48-9), could, on the
surface, be perceived as a symbol of Palestine destroying Israel. However, the absurdity of the
image and the physical impossibility of such a reaction between a tank and a peach pit leads the
viewer to assume that Suleiman is mocking the notion that Palestine, with the military might of a
peach pit, could pose an existential threat to Israel, who possesses the military might of armored
tanks. The hyperbole of the interaction of the tank and the peach pit calls into question the
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legitimacy of Israel‟s security claims against Palestine. If Israel‟s need to protect itself from
Palestinians is false, then Israel‟s presence on the borders and in the West Bank are equally
illegitimate.
The second violent fantasy occurs after ES has visited his father in the hospital for the
first time and shifts the focus of the film to the al-Ram checkpoint and ES‟s relationship. The
woman ES is dating is an Arab who resides in the West Bank. As such, she cannot freely pass
into Jerusalem, where ES lives. The second fantasy scene is ES‟s dream of overcoming the
hurdle of the checkpoint. In this scene, the woman steps out of her car and boldly walks across
the checkpoint without flinching, despite the Israeli soldiers commanding her to stop and
pointing their guns at her. As she passes through the closed checkpoint, the watchtower
collapses. Ball points out that the power of Suleiman‟s female protagonist does not emanate from
her ability to reproduce or from her symbolism of a “raped and pillaged land,” traditional sources
of power for women in Palestinian film and literature, but from her “assertive territorial
reclamation” (20), but she is still the object of the male dreamer‟s national fantasies (24). This
fantasy scene appears in the film before the viewer is aware of the identity of the woman and the
significance of the checkpoint. In the following scenes, the narrative of the two lovers develops
at the checkpoint, and the viewer is able to understand why ES would desire its destruction and
her passing through it. Without this added narrative, this scene seems somewhat arbitrary, though
politically pointed none the less. Gertz and Khleifi point out that Roadblock movies, such as
Divine Intervention, strive to overcome fragmentation and disintegration, to „steal the borders‟
(“Roadblock” 325) and it is through this fantasy scene that the female protagonist is able to do
just that. Through this scene and the narrative of the lovers, the film demonstrates that the goals
of Palestinians to control their own boarders and move freely within their territory is just. The
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checkpoint becomes the primary barrier to ES having a normal relationship with his girl friend, a
goal which in any part of the world is reasonable.
The most violent fantasy in the film occurs after the woman has left ES and after he has
spent two evenings waiting for her at the checkpoint. The scene is also related to a billboard
advertisement that ES sees while driving in the car. The advertisement, which shows the face of
a Palestinian resistance fighter wearing a keffeya, is for a firing range and reads “Come shoot if
you are ready.” ES‟s fantasy is set at this shooting range and opens with several Israeli men
firing at targets on which Palestinians are painted. They shoot all but one target, and as they take
aim upon the remaining target, a single Palestinian freedom fighter steps out from behind it.
After no provocation, they proceed to open fire on the freedom fighter, and the freedom fighter
proceeds to eliminate the men, as well as a helicopter, using rocks, grenades, ninja stars, and a
Palestine-shaped shield. Towards the end of the battle, the keffeya unwraps to reveal that the
freedom fighter is none other than ES‟s lover. After she is finished killing the men, she walks
back to the one remaining target and steps behind it, leaving the scene. This fantasy scene is
perhaps the most violent and the most reliant on the narrative plot for its significance. While the
other fantasy scenes contain violent or subversive acts, this scene involves a freedom fighter
killing Israelis. Without the narrative context, this scene would not make sense with the rest of
the film. The viewer is aware that ES has seen the sign for the shooting range and it angered him.
The viewer is also aware by this point, that ES sees his girlfriend in his fantasies as an emblem of
resistance, thus her presence is explicable and not terribly surprising. The various political
symbols encompassed within this scene give it a political significance outside of the story line,
but the violence and location can only be justified through the narrative thread. The fact that the
Israeli soldiers fire upon the freedom fighter without provocation and are training using images
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of Palestinians as target practice also underscores the societal belief that Palestinians are the
victims of unwarranted Israeli aggression.
While Suleiman‟s film confirms the societal beliefs that Israel is illegitimate, Palestinians
are the victims, and Palestinian‟s goals are just, it counters the belief that Palestinians can do no
wrong and, in so doing, highlights the tension that had built in the Palestinian population.
Throughout the film, many of the segments show Palestinians losing their tempers over small
things; one man rips the license plate off of a car because its owner refused to move it, another
destroys a young boy‟s soccer ball because the boy kicked it onto the man‟s roof, and the
opening scene shows ES‟s father using all manner of obscenities to describe his neighbors as he
drives to work. These instances, as well as the final scene of the film, in which ES and his
mother watch a pressure cooker, indicate that there is a violent tension that is only just being
contained by the Palestinians, and it eeks out through disrespectful and even violent acts towards
their neighboring Palestinians. Gertz and Khleifi argue that, in Divine Intervention, “daily life
has been transformed into a static routine ridden with hate, rage and friction” (“Roadblock” 323)
and Suleiman explains that the frustration that comes out in the film is the result of the stasis and
paralysis that was brought about by being an Arab living in Israel and the ensuing hopelessness
(Suleiman 70). While each of the previously mentioned scenes contains individual acts, the
juxtaposition and repetition of the scenes demonstrate the pervasiveness of these tensions, and it
is this pervasiveness that relates the behavior to the conflict as a whole. Unlike in Canticle of the
Stones, these are not private isolated incidents. They are the effect of the spacial and economic
restrictions of the occupation and the hopelessness of living as an Arab in Israel. However, this
tension in Suleiman‟s film, unlike the violence in Abu-Assad‟s, is not directed at Israel. Only the
fantasy scenes involve violence directed at Israel. This admission that Palestinians are not always
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nice to one another and do not always agree is a small step towards the ideological leap that
Paradise Now makes by demonstrating that Palestinian in-fighting has played a role in the
stagnation of the progress and that Palestinians can also be the aggressors in the conflict.
Though Elia Suleiman‟s film style is apparent in both Chronicle of a Disappearance and
Divine Intervention, because of the violent fantasy scenes and a more nuanced ideological stance
in the latter, Suleiman must include stronger narratives. The narrative strands are necessary to
incorporate the fantasy scenes into both films and to give the fantasy scenes personal as well as
political significance. The narrative strands are also necessary, particularly in the more recent
film, in order to justify and explain the violence of the fantasy scenes, without which the scenes
seem arbitrary and out of place. The amount of violence in Divine Intervention correlates with
the presence of an organized resistance movement in Palestine while the ideological shift in the
film correlates with the negative image of Palestinians in the hyperreality produced by the media
and the West‟s rejection of the concept of Palestinians as victims. These two films, coupled with
Khleifi and Abu-Assad‟s films, demonstrate an interesting relationship between Western public
opinion and ideology in the films as well as between the presence of violence in the films and the
presence of organized resistance movements on the ground.
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Conclusion
At any given time, Western public opinion has generally accepted the Palestinian
narrative and viewed the Palestinians as the victim of the Israeli occupation or rejected it and
viewed the Palestinians as the aggressors in the conflict. This acceptance or rejection of the view
of Palestinians as victims appears, based on my analysis, to have a strong correlation to how
Palestinian film makers display and treat the four core Palestinian beliefs that Rouhana and BarTal claim are essential in the prolongation of the conflict and which bolster the Palestinian
simulacral narrative. Over the 17 year span of these four films, the Palestinian simulacral
narrative was accepted by the media and, as a result, Western public opinion, but gradually came
to be rejected over the years. As the Palestinian simulacral narrative began to be rejected by
Western public opinion, the core beliefs that support the narrative also began to be questioned in
these four films.
During the first Intifada, when the West‟s hyperreality was saturated with images of
Palestinians suffering at the hands of Israeli soldiers, Western public opinion favored the
Palestinian simulacral narrative. Khleifi‟s film, produced during this time period, strongly
confirmed all four societal beliefs that bolster the Palestinian simulacral narrative through the use
of graphic violence in his film. During the early nineties, the media saturated the hyperreality
with images and stories that indicated that the Oslo Accords had finally solved the IsraeliPalestinian conflict which created an atmosphere of relative neutrality regarding the
victimization of Palestinians. Suleiman‟s Chronicle of a Disappearance, filmed during the early
nineties, only weakly confirms the societal beliefs and simulacral narrative. His later film, Divine
Intervention, however, only confirms three of the four societal beliefs and was filmed after the 911 attack, which caused Western public opinion to reject any group of people who consistently
used suicide bombings. Palestinians, as a whole, were conflated with the extremist groups who
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used terroristic methods which damaged their international reputation. Abu-Assad‟s film was
created during a time of Palestinians disunity and as violent resistance was gaining popular
support within the territory, and Arafat, who had long been the face of the PA, was suffering
political humiliations. Paradise Now, filmed during this turbulent time, actually contradicts half
of the societal beliefs that support the Palestinian simulacral narrative.
Another trend that developed during the course of my analysis is an apparent correlation
between the presence of visual violence in the films and the presence of an organized resistance
movement in the West Bank. In Canticle of the Stones, filmed during the first Intifada, and
Divine Intervention, filmed during the second Intifada, there are higher quantities of visually
violent scenes. In Chronicle of a Disappearance and Paradise Now, both filmed after Intifadas
had ended or broken down, there is comparably little visual violence. This trend cannot be easily
dismissed as a matter of the director‟s personal film style because both Chronicle of a
Disappearance and Divine Intervention were directed by Elia Suleiman. Though it is difficult to
draw causal links between Western public opinion and the acceptance or rejection of Palestinian
societal beliefs in Palestinian film or between the presence of visual violence in the films and the
presence of organized resistance on the ground, given the transnational nature of the films and
the directors, the correlation based on this analysis appears noteworthy and warrants further
scrutiny in relationship to these transnational directors‟ desire to appeal to both Western and
Eastern audiences.
This analysis, however, does suffer from issues that make drawing definitive conclusions
difficult. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is that these four films are a small sample of
Palestinian films and my use of them was more a product of availability than of their
representativeness of Palestinian films as a whole. Alexander‟s assertion that Palestinian films
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made during the first Intifada tended to be less violent (“Is There a Palestinian Cinema?” 156)
draws into question the representativeness of Canticle of the Stones as a first Intifada film. When
trying to locate films made during the first Intifada, Canticle of the Stones was one of the only
films to which I was able to obtain access for this paper, and, as a result, may not be a useful
representation of other films produced during that time. Alexander cites Rashid Masharawi‟s
1993 film, Curfew, as a good example of first Intifada films (“Is there a Palestinian Cinema”),
but I was unable to obtain a copy of the film with English subtitles, and my Arabic is not yet
adequate to watch it without a translation. This study also leaves out a number of prominent and
prolific Palestinian producers, most notably Rashid Masharawi and Ali Nassar, both of whom
Gertz and Khleifi discuss at length in their book as significant directors. As a result this study is
preliminary and the trends that I have proposed need to be examined in a broader selection of
films. Using Rouhanna and Bar-Tal‟s societal beliefs as a framework for this analysis also had its
positive and negative qualities. While using their research as a framework for my analysis gave
me specific, psychologically significant, societal beliefs to examine, limiting myself to those four
societal beliefs is potentially overly simplistic. The causes of the continuation of the conflict go
far beyond these four societal beliefs.
Though it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions without further research and
consideration of other films, if Gertz and Khleifi‟s assertions that the Palestinian population has
traditionally used film as a means of establishing a more concrete national identity and
Telmissany‟s argument that “Palestinian cinema constitutes a site for negotiation and circulation
of values and behaviors that contribute to the assertion of Palestinian cultural and national
identities” (70) are correct, the potential relationship between film, Western public opinion, and
the hyperreality of the conflict created by the media could be significant. Palestinians have
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traditionally been denied the right to define, not only their media representation (Alexander
“Palestinian Films” 325) but also their story in general. Bresheeth argues that “the dispossession
brought about by occupation is even deeper and more painful than „just‟ losing home and
country. The ultimate loss is that of losing your story, your identity, losing the right to tell your
own story, your own history” (79). When discussing A Tale of Three Jewells, Khleifi argues that
identity formation for children requires both reality and imagination to construct a whole, unified
identity (Khleifi and Alexander 31). A similar argument can be made when discussing the role of
film in the formation of Palestinian identity. Because the right to define themselves, to tell their
story, has been denied for so long, the role of film in “filling in the blanks,” so to speak, and
helping to create a unified identity is, indeed, an important undertaking. However, given the
transnational nature of modern Palestinian film production, it is also important to understand the
various interests and influences acting upon these important films. If the interpretation of the
conflict by the media effects Western public opinion and if Western public opinion effects the
ideology presented in Palestinians films and if this ideology is then used, as Gertz and Khleifi
claim, to establish a cohesive Palestinian national identity, then Palestinian film is, on some
levels, triply removed from the reality of the conflict and any national identity that results from
the films is quadrupley removed. However, there are many “if‟s” in that statement and identity
formation is a complex and complicated process.
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